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and insights about how the constitutional system actually works in 
practice. 
Moreover, when the vertical dimension of constitutional law is 
taken into account, the complexities facing constitutional theory be-
come much greater still. In short, notwithstanding the important 
contributions of Ackerman, Mount and others, much work still 
needs to be done. 
METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS. 
By Haig Bosmajian.1 Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press. 1992. Pp. xiv, 240. Cloth, $22.50. 
Eileen A. Scallen2 
One of my colleagues, a tax professor, heard that I was review-
ing Haig Bosmajian's book and bet that I would not find a meta-
phor in the regulations to the United States Tax Code. It took less 
than ten minutes of paging through the tax regulations to hit a 
couple-"safe harbor," "golden parachute"-then I stopped, lest I 
be accused of overkill.3 My colleague's challenge illustrates and ex-
tends one of Bosmajian's central points: "[a]t all judicial levels, 
I. Professor of Speech Communication, University of Washington, Seattle. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. 
Thanks to Joe Costella, Mary Kay Kane, Calvin Massey, Mary Wagner and Tom 
Weidenbach, who commented on earlier drafts of this review. 
3. My correspondence with the judge of our bet-the good professor's spouse, a distin-
guished student of literature-follows. The names have been changed to protect the inno-
cent. And me. 
To: Ms. Susan Spouse 
From: Professor Eileen A. Scallen 
Re: Metaphors in the Tax Code & Regs 
As you will recall, I bet your distinguished husband that I could find a metaphor in the 
regulations to the United States Tax Code. He was, to put it politely, skeptical. You kindly 
agreed to judge my efforts, which I set forth herein. 
A metaphor, as you know, is "[a] figure of speech in which two unlike objects are com-
pared by identification or by the substitution of one for the other." Karl Beckson and Arthur 
Ganz, Literary Terms: A Dictionary 156 (Noonday Press, 3rd ed. 1989). 
My assignment was not difficult. I will not tax you with the boring details, but I discov-
ered that metaphors are pervasive in both the tax regs and the tax code. Just a few examples 
should suffice. I.R.C. section 2800 sets forth the rule for "Golden Parachute Payments." 
Both the code and the regs refer to "safe harbors," see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(gX2). 
Of course, there are also the less transparent figures of speech. For example, property is 
described as being "in the hands of' someone (over 600 times in the regs alone, according to 
Lexis). If the drafters wanted to eschew metaphorical language, why didn't they say "in the 
possession of," or "in the control of' someone? 
Oh well, I'm glad they didn't. I believe I have won our bet. Hope to see you again soon 
Susan. 
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metaphors, metonymies, personifications, and other tropes appear-
ing in court opinions have attained permanence, have become insti-
tutionalized and relied upon as principles, standards, doctrines, and 
premises in arriving at judicial judgments." As my colleague dis-
covered, legislators and administrative agencies are no more im-
mune to using figures of speech than are judges. 
My bet with my col!eague, and this book, reflect a very old, but 
timeless, debate about the role of language, or more broadly, rheto-
ric, in the creation of truth. Bosmajian quotes philosophers who 
vilified the use of figurative language in discourse about truth and 
reality. John Locke presents the typical view: 
If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all 
the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial 
and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are 
for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, 
and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect 
cheat; and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may 
render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are cer-
tainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly 
to be avoided and, where truth and knowledge are concerned, 
cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or per-
son who makes u:>e of them.4 
Yet the book notes that scholars and practitioners of the law have 
always had a natural interest in figurative language, realizing, as 
Richard Posner points out, "that in the areas of law that matter-
the areas of disagreement-to divorce style and content is not an 
attainable goal."s Bosmajian believes that instead of attempting to 
"purify" our language--eliminating style and figures of speech-
our efforts should be directed at understanding how legal language 
functions. This is Bosmajian's goal. 
Bosmajian is quick to point out both the benefit and burden of 
figurative language, quoting one of the most accomplished authors 
of judicial prose, Benjamin Cardozo: "Metaphors in law are to be 
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they 
end often by enslaving it."6 Metaphors and other figures of speech 
have a wonderful power to make the abstract concepts and doc-
trines of the law become concrete, and thus real, to those who must 
understand and apply them. However, when we are unconscious or 
4. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 327, quoted in Bosmajian 
at 37-38. 
5. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 298 (I 988), 
quoted in Bosmajian at 13. 
6. Berky v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926) (Cardozo, J.), quoted in Bos-
majian at 12. 
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forgetful of the suggestive power of language, we risk becoming lim-
ited by the images that we have selected in the past or, more omi-
nously, by the images that others have selected for us. This is why 
Bosmajian's topic is so important. Critics of the use of legal lan-
guage can make us see, for the first time, or in a new way, what we 
have overlooked about the dominant images in our language. Criti-
cism of legal rhetoric is not an easy task. Although Bosmajian's 
recent work is a solid and scholarly contribution, it reflects many of 
the problems that face any critic of language in law. 
Haig Bosmajian is a professor of speech communication at the 
University of Washington, Seattle. His particular scholarly interest 
is the First Amendment, and he uses that body of constitutional law 
to explore the use of certain figures of speech in judicial decisions. 
He readily acknowledges, however, that figures of speech regularly 
appear outside of the constitutional context, and challenges "others 
to make what they will of 'yellow dog contracts,' 'wraparound 
mortgage,' 'ripe for adjudication,' 'at first blush,' 'floating capital,' 
'heir of the blood,' 'negative pregnant' and 'dead freight.' " More-
over, he restricts his investigation to certain types of figures of 
speech, those that he classes as "tropes," including metaphor, me-
tonymies and personification. In this sense, the title of the book is a 
bit misleading, as it concerns more than metaphor in judicial opin-
ions. Of course, "Tropes and Reason in Judicial Opinions" does 
not make an accessible or interesting book title. 
Unfortunately, Bosmajian creates a serious problem for his 
reader by postponing definition of his central concepts of metaphor, 
metonymy and personification until about three-fourths of the way 
through the book. 1 Here, Bosmajian collects several observations 
by other scholars. For example, to distinguish metaphor and me-
tonymy, he quotes J. David Sapir: 
Metaphor states an equivalence between terms taken from sepa-
rate semantic domains: George the Lion might be an expression 
applied to a football player, for instance. Metonymy replaces or 
juxtaposes contiguous terms that occupy a distinct and separate 
place within what is considered a single semantic or perceptual 
domain. Homer will often be used instead of the Iliad ("You will 
read in Homer .... "), where agent replaces act; or the phrase 
"deep in his cups," where "cups" as container stands for the 
sherry or wine that is contained. s 
Quoting Kenneth Burke, Bosmajian states "The basic 'strategy' in 
7. My preferred definition of metaphor appears supra note 3. . .. 
8. J. David Sapir, ed., The Social Use of Metaphor 4 (1977), quoted m BosmaJtan at 
145. 
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metonymy is this: to convey some incorporeal or intangible state in 
terms of the corporeal or tangible, e.g., to speak of 'the heart' rather 
than 'the emotions.' "9 
We are told that metaphor and metonymy have different func-
tions. Bosmajian quotes George Lakoff and Mark Johnson: 
Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms 
of another, and its primary function is understanding. Meton-
ymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that 
is, it allows us to use one entity to stand for another. But meton-
ymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function 
of providing understanding.IO 
Bosmajian turns to Hugh Blair, an eighteenth-century Scottish pro-
fessor of rhetoric, to define personification as "when we introduce 
inanimate objects acting like those that have life." 11 
If you find these definitions somewhat confusing, I am not sur-
prised. The problem with the belated assortment of definitions Bos-
majian offers is that we are subjected to the general scholarly 
confusion about the definition of metaphor and other tropes. As 
Wayne Booth has noted, "[m]etaphor has by now been defined in so 
many ways that there is no human expression, whether in language 
or any other medium, that would not be metaphoric in someone 's 
definiti0n."12 While we might not expect Bosmajian to provide the 
definitive definition of metaphor, it would have helped if, early in 
the book, he had shaped his own definitions for the tropes he dis-
cusses. Bosmajian provides us with no sure common ground on 
which to evaluate his characterizations of metaphors and other 
tropes in the First Amendment cases. Bosmajian aimed at keeping 
his book "free of legalese and academese, making the book accessi-
ble to the educated layperson." He did keep the book relatively free 
of clear definition, but this undermines his objective of accessibility. 
It is a sad comment that experts in communication, not only Bos-
majian but also those scholars he quotes, have such a difficult time 
helping even an educated and interested audience understand the 
basic terms of their discipline. 
For a sophisticatedl3 or undaunted reader, Bosmajian has col-
9. Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives and Rhetoric of Motives 506 (1962), quoted 
in Bosmajian at 144. 
10. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By 36 (1980) (emphasis in 
original), quoted in Bosmajian at 145. 
II. Hugh Blair, I Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 327 (1965), quoted in Bos-
majian at 167. 
12. Wayne C. Booth, Metaphor as Rhetoric: The Problem of Evaluation, in Sheldon 
Sacks, ed., On Metaphor 48 (U. of Chi. Press, 1979) (emphasis in original). 
13. In ancient Greece, the sophists were some of the first teachers and writers on the 
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lected a rich body of material for analysis. In his introductory three 
chapters, Bosmajian addresses the function of the judicial opinion 
and the function of style-specifically the tropes of metaphor, me-
tonymy and personification-in the judicial opinion. His final six 
chapters focus on specific figures of speech in the First Amendment 
context. He examines the metaphors of "the marketplace of ideas," 
a "wall of separation" between church and state, "chilling effect," 
"captive audience" and "fires" of speech that lead to a "conflagra-
tion." He looks at the application of the trope of metonymy in his 
chapter entitled " 'Shedding' Rights at the 'Schoolhouse Gate' and 
Other Judicial Metonymies." He also considers the use of personifi-
cation, including the most familiar personification of law-"the 
'lady of Justice,' Themis, who is blindfolded, with a scale in one 
hand and a sword in the other, the former conveying balanced judg-
ment, the latter authority and protection." In each of these chap-
ters, Bosmajian discusses the history of the particular trope, 
provides examples of its use in various judicial decisions, demon-
strates its impact on subsequent opinions and discusses whether the 
particular trope is appropriate and effective. 
Bosmajian's approach illustrates the problems of attempting to 
analyze and evaluate legal rhetoric. How do you measure the sig-
nificance of a metaphor? More generally, how should you judge the 
merits of legal discourse? 
Bosmajian tends to weigh the significance of a metaphor by the 
number of times it is quoted by subsequent judicial opinions. 14 He 
puts forward his conclusion, for example, that the "marketplace of 
ideas" is a significant judicial metaphor, and then proceeds to put 
all of his data before us, repeating some examples several times 
within a chapter, and then again in other chapters.ts The chief 
subject of rhetoric. See George A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular 
Tradition from Ancient to Modem Times (U. of N.C. Press, 1980). Plato, a particularly ac-
complished rhetorician himself, began the smear cantpaign against the sophists, their tech-
niques and their philosophy in the Gorgias. 
14. A similar methodology is employed by scholars who purport to measure the impact 
of law reviews by the number of times they are cited. See e.g., Janet M. Gumm, ed., Chicago-
Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 509 (1990); Fred R. Sha-
piro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1540 (1985). The methodology is 
not completely worthless, since it suggests which journals are more likely to be read than 
others, but it is extremely limited in explaining either why a particular journal is read fre-
quently or why a particular article may be significant. See Max Stier, Kelly M. Klaus, Dan 
L. Bagatell and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Law Review Usage and Suggestions For Improvement: A 
Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1467, 1474-75 (1992). 
15. An example of Professor Bosmajian's approach: 
When in 1988 the Supreme Court unanimously decided for Hustler magazine 
and against Jerry Falwell, who had sued the magazine to recover damages for inva-
sion of privacy, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, [then] Justice 
Rehnquist, delivering the opinion of the Court, relied on the "marketplace of ideas" 
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problem with this approach is that the critic becomes merely a cata-
loguer, collecting and labelling specimens. A secondary problem 
with this approach is that Bosmajian's examples tend to exhaust 
and numb the reader rather than to highlight the metaphor. How-
ever, one advantage of this method is that it starkly reveals how 
poor judges are at creating fresh metaphors, and how easily they are 
trapped by stale metaphors.'6 
Bosmajian does not explain clearly how he thinks we should 
evaluate judicial rhetoric. His explicit standard is this: "Are the 
tropes useful in creating clearer perceptions, or do they confuse and 
mislead?" But this approach comes close to adopting Locke's stan-
dard-language should be a conduit of the truth rather than a de-
vice to obfuscate the truth. At another point, however, Bosmajian 
seems to recognize that this is a false dilemma, for he states 
"[t]hrough metaphors, whether political, economic, judicial, or eve-
ryday expression, we define and redefine our 'realities' and our 
'truths.'" While reading Bosmajian's book, one longs to see him 
engage in less taxonomy and more analysis and reflection, exploring 
the full function of the metaphor and other tropes in creating our 
"realities" and "truths" about the First Amendment. 
Bosmajian quotes with approval the philosopher Monroe 
Beardsley: "Because of its very complexity, its multiplicity of mean-
ing, a metaphor is hard to control-to keep from saying things you 
don't want to say, along with the things you do want to say."'? 
While "unintended" meanings can be problematic from a logician's 
point of view, they can be very important to a critic of legal lan-
guage such as Bosmajian, because they can reveal how a metaphor 
has functioned to shape our perspectives, sometimes more clearly 
and candidly than "intended" meanings. 
To explore intended and unintended meanings sounds very 
nice in theory, but how do you do it? Bosmajian is at his best when 
he shows us some of his techniques. His primary method is etymo-
logical-explicating the historical roots of words. 
His use of this approach is particularly effective in analyzing 
the "captive audience" metaphor as applied to the First Amend-
ment rights of public school students. In Tinker v. Des Moines In-
three 'times, the personification "breathing space" for First Amendment freedoms 
three times, and the metaphoric "chilling effect" once, along with "fighting words" 
and several other tropes. The judiciary's heavy reliance on this type of nonliteral 
language demonstrates that tropes are an integral part of the opinions of the courts. 
(footnote omitted). 
16. Notice how difficult it is to refrain from resorting to metaphor even in discussing 
metaphor. 
17. Monroe Beardsley, Thinking Straight 245 (2d ed. 1950), quoted in Bosmajian at 38. 
486 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:480 
dependent Community School Dist.,Is which held that public school 
officials violated the First Amendment by disciplining students for 
wearing black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam, Justice For-
tas stated: "In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communi-
cate. They may not be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments that are officially approved."I9 Bosmajian contrasts Justice 
Fortas's view with that of former Chief Justice Warren Burger and 
of Chief Justice Rehnquist. In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fra-
ser,2o which held that a school board's action in disciplining a stu-
dent for a sexually suggestive speech nominating a classmate for a 
student government office did not violate the First Amendment, 
Chief Justice Burger quoted two historians as saying that public ed-
ucation " 'must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as val-
ues in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to 
the practice of self-government in the community and the na-
tion.' "21 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion in Board of 
Education, Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 22 
held a similar view: "The idea that such students have a right to 
access, in the school, to information other than that thought by their 
educators to be necessary is contrary to the very nature of an incul-
cative education. "23 
By using an etymological approach, Bosmajian reveals another 
dimension to Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist's position. 
Professor Bosmajian exposes "inculcative education" as an oxymo-
ron-a contradiction in terms. He states: 
There is an anomaly in the Court's asserting that students 
are not "closed-circuit recipients" and then telling us that the 
schools have an inculcative function. Inculcation, unlike educa-
tion, implies that students are closed-circuit recipients. The word 
inculcate is derived from the Latin inculcare, which means liter-
ally "to stamp in with the heel, tread in, cram in, press in, im-
press upon (the mind)." It is not uncoincidental [sic] that the 
first uses of the word inculcate dealt with religious matters re-
lated to faith and not inquiry, to doctrine and not diversity, to 
orthodoxy and not freedom. 
In contrast, educate means literally "to lead out, to elicit, to 
draw out," the word educate being derived from e-ducare. To 
18. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
19. I d. at 511. 
20. 478 u.s. 675 (1986). 
21. Id. at 681, quoting C. Beard and M. Beard, New Basic History of the United States 
228 (1968). 
22. 457 u.s. 853 (1982). 
23. ld. at 914 (emphasis in original). 
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educe, unlike inculcate, means to arrive at something through 
reasoning. Inculcating students runs counter to the Court's posi-
tion in Tinker that students are not "closed-circuit recipients of 
only that which the State chooses to communicate." (emphasis in 
original). 
487 
Although etymological analysis is often intrinsically interesting 
to students of language, and revealing of the Justices' pedagogical 
bias in the school cases, a perceptive critic cannot proceed by it 
alone, and Bosmajian relies on it almost exclusively. The etymolog-
ical approach is limited to revealing a shift from the historical roots 
of a word to its present use. In the school cases, for example, the 
shift suggests that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist have 
very definite opinions about how children should be taught, opin-
ions that shape the Justices' view of the First Amendment in a very 
different way than Justice Fortas viewed it in Tinker.24 An etymo-
logical analysis provides this evidence even though the Justices did 
not make their pedagogical and philosophical biases explicit. 
However, an etymological approach does not help the critic go 
beyond this-to explore the present meaning or to explain why the 
shift from the historical roots occurred. Indeed, one can make a 
similar criticism of textualist judges who use etymology to justify 
meaning that is allegedly plain.2s Etymology can be used to make it 
seem as if individual words have a particular, fixed, or natural 
meaning, which the reader is supposed to accept and which always 
supports the writer's point of view. While resort to etymology pro-
vides interesting historical background that may be relevant to the 
present interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision, it 
alone does little to justify that present interpretation.26 
Bosmajian's analysis is also limited by its excessive focus on 
one type or category of figurative speech. In focusing on tropes, 
Professor Bosmajian explicitly excludes from his discussion an anal-
24. Bethel and Tinker represent two polar opposite views of the function of education: 
assimilation to the dominant culture (Bethel) and exposure to a multiplicity of ideas, thus 
enabling the individual to select the "best" (Tinker). The oxymoron "inculcative education" 
reflects a preference for a particular foundational paradigm of the First Amendment. See 
Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free 
Expression, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 103, 143-148 (1992). 
25. See Dennis R. Klinck, The Word of the Law: Approaches to Legal Discourse 336-37 
(Carleton U. Press, 1992) (criticizing etymological approach using Canadian and English 
cases). 
26. Moreover, if you are going to use an etymological approach, you have to do it 
correctly. For example, in attempting to argue for a plain-meaning interpretation of the con-
frontation clause, Justice Scalia got the etymology of "confrontation" completely wrong in 
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988). See Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of 
Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 623, 
637-38 (1992). 
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ysis of a different category of figures, "schemes, (such as antithesis, 
asyndeton, anaphora, antimetabole)," arguing that while these tech-
niques may contribute to persuasive effect, "they do not have the 
impact on meaning or conceptualization that tropes do." This is a 
highly debatable point, and Bosmajian does not defend it. 
For example, using Bosmajian's most common standard of 
evaluation, frequency of citation, Justice Holmes's classic antithesis, 
"[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience,"27 
probably has been quoted more frequently than any of the meta-
phors that Bosmajian identifies.2s The value of this antithesis is 
more, however, than the fact that it made a good "sound bite." By 
pitting the term "logic" against the more inclusive term "experi-
ence," Justice Holmes helped to shape a jurisprudential landscape. 
In Justice Holmes's antithesis, "logic" means formal logic, such as 
the syllogism. But "experience" may include both formal logic and 
"[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political 
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even 
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men. "29 The 
notion of "experience" as a source of law foreshadowed the move-
ment to legal realism and to its successors, such as critical legal 
studies, feminism and pragmatism. Indeed, the scheme of antithesis 
has a "conceptual" function. It parallels and reinforces the adver-
sarial structure--plaintiff versus defendant, guilty versus not guilty, 
liable versus not liable. This form can contribute to our tendency to 
view "truth" in a legal context as one of two choices, and direct our 
energy toward choosing one of two alternatives instead of searching 
for a third alternative, a fourth alternative and onward. In this 
sense, the scheme of antithesis is just as important to conceptualiza-
tion as the tropes of metaphor, metonymy or personification. 
Criticism that focuses on just one type of figure leaves out a 
good bit of the story. Sometimes there is good reason to focus on 
one metaphor to address a larger story.Jo But when one attempts a 
broader project, such as Bosmajian's, a critic might be more helpful 
in analyzing the variety of figures that judges use, how the figures 
contribute individually to the message, and how they interact with 
27. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law I (Little, Brown & Co., 1881). 
28. Richard Posner attempted to measure Benjamin Cardozo's reputation using a simi-
lar standard of frequency of citation. Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 72-
79 (U. of Chi. Press, 1990). And, as with the law review citation studies, supra note 14, Judge 
Posner has been criticized for using this rough quantitative measure to draw qualitative con-
clusions about reputation. See Book Note, The Judge's Path to Greatness, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 
788, 792 (1991) (reviewing Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (1990)). 
29. Holmes, The Common Law at I (cited in note 27). 
30. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (1988). 
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one another. For example, is the scheme of antithesis reinforced by 
metaphors of confrontation or personification? Does the speaker 
portray abstract entities going "head to head"? Moreover, a critic 
might go beyond figures of speech to explore how the figures work 
within the overall structure and form of the text. Is a text, contain-
ing several antitheses and metaphors of confrontation, divided into 
two contrasting sections, sending and reaffirming the message that 
the truth is only one of two choices? There are many tools and 
techniques that a critic may use, including a growing body of social 
science study into how we use metaphor, other figures of speech and 
linguistic forms.3I These studies cannot replace a sensitive critic in 
arguing about the meaning of a piece of judicial rhetoric, but they 
provide additional material for the critic's argument. 
Bosmajian has made a sound contribution to the ongoing dis-
cussion about the role of language in legal discourse. His book does 
reveal several methodological problems with which all critics of 
legal discourse must contend. These problems provide additional 
opportunities for investigation and argument. They are not reasons 
for rejecting Bosmajian's central message: Law is language-based. 
As judges, academics, legislators, and lawyers--even tax lawyers-
we should watch our language. 
NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS. 
Edited by Robert P. George. 1 New York: Clarendon Press, 
Oxford. 1992. Pp. 371. $39.95. 
Steven D. Smith2 
I 
A little over a decade ago, John Ely explained that natural law 
is, for purposes of constitutional adjudication at least, "uselessly 
vague." This defect is also, Ely suggested, the source of natural 
law's persistent appeal: "The advantage, one gathers, is that you can 
invoke natural law to support anything you want. The disadvan-
31. Although we still have a great deal to learn. See Calvin Morrill and Peter C. Facci-
ola, The Power of Language in Adjudication and Mediation: Institutional Contexts as 
Predictors of Social Evaluation, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 191 (1992); Richard D. Rieke and 
Randall K. Stutman, Communication in Legal Advocacy 210-11, 216-18 (U. of S. Carolina 
Press, 1990) (collecting research and applying it to closing arguments). 
I. Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Colorado. 
